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Bargaining options under the Employment 
Contracts Act 
Pat Walsh• 
The Employment Contracts Act is intended to influence the pattern of bargaining 
and the resulting contracts. This paper .examines the factors that may influence 
employers and employees in exercis.ing their ba~gaining options. 
1. Introduction 
• 
The Employment Contracts Act is the product of deeply held grievances on the part 
of employers and the Government over the structure and outcomes of ~collective 
bargaining under the Labour Relations Act It is, accordingly, designed to promote if not 
coerce substantial ~change. All employers and employees face uncertainty and potential 
upheaval in their bargaining arrangements under the new legislation. This article 
introduces some of the issues that need to be faced in considering bargaining options v 
under the new legislation. 
2. lndivid·ual contracts 
All parties hav~e to consider the possibility of a significant shift from collectively 
negotiated conditions of employment to individual ~contracts. Individual contracts are 
sometimes presented as involving one individual, the worker, negotiating directly with 
another individual, the employer. In fact, of course, it involves an individual worker 
facing a collective - an organization with far greater resources than can be mustered by an 
"' individual, whether represented by a bargaining agent or not. For this r~eason, workers, 
, especially those at lower levels in the organizational hierarchy, have historically preferred 
~collective negotiations so as to mitigate the vulnerability of the individual. In the 
P.~csent economic circumstanc~~ there does not appear to be any particular reason for 
these preferences to change. There will be exceptions - workers who possess skills or 
expertise In snort supply, or whose experience or particular abilities make them essential 
to their organization. 'These workers may feel confident that their bargaining leverage is 
such as to overcome the potential disadvantages of bargaining as an individut!D In the 
state sector, where collective bargaining has historically been at a much higher level than 
in the private sector, but where senior managers have recently shifted from collectiv~e to 
individual arrangements, there may be pressure for individual contracts from employees 
just below that level. In some small workplaces, workers may feel secure enough in 
their relationship with their employer that they seek individual ~contracts. But it is 
unlikely that large proportions of the workforce will seek to replace their ~collectiv~e 
contract with an individual contract of employment. It is more likely that some 
employees will pursue particular issues either not covered in the collective contract, or 
dealt with unsatisfactorily, by way of an individual contract which supplements rather 
than supplants their collectiv~e contract. It should not be overlooked that the Act does not 
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prohibit a person negotiating a variety of contracts covering different sets of issues, 
providing he or she can persuade the other party to agree to this. 
The main impetus for replacing collective contracts with individual contracts will come 
from employers. A number of issues affect an employer's decision to do this: 
First, the number of employees presently covered by collectively negotiated 
conditions will clearly be a factor in considering whether or not to move to individual 
contracts. The transaction costs in negotiating large numbers of individual contracts will 
deter most employers unless there are other obvious advantages, or the employer is able 
to minimize the transaction costs, perhaps by offering a standard for1n contract to all 
employees. In the Iauer case, however, the employer might well be bbtter off retaining a 
collective contract, as the offering of an individual contract opens the door to negotiations 
on an individual basis. The employer may find that the final outcomes are not at all 
standard. The main appeal to employers of the standard fo11n contract approach is 
strategic. It divides a workforce previously employed under one contract and thereby 
weakens them industrially. This may then make it more feasible in future negotiations 
for an employer to worsen conditions for some workers, while maintaining or improving 
them for others. Alternatively, it may allow employers to worsen them for all workers. 
These objectives are normally more difficult to achieve under a collective contract. 
Negotiating contracts directly with the workers may also deprive trade unions or private 
bargaining agents of any presence in the workplace. It is obviously relevant to this issue 
that workers are prevented from striking over the renegotiation of an individual contract. 
Second, the proportion of employees who are unionized may affect employer 
preferences for collective or individual bargaining. This will become a more significant 
factor if union density falls substantially in the next few years. If aggregate union 
density does fall considerably, then an employer facing a largely unionized workforce is 
more likely to be dealing with fairly committed union members with a strong preference 
for collective negotiations. In those circumstances, a push for individual contracts may 
not hold much appeal. In contrast, a largely ununionized workforce is most unlikely to 
have the inclination or the capacity to organize collectively. 
Third, employers with a strong desire to reduce labour costs, or to make more 
flexible use of their labour resources may believe that this can be more easily achieved 
through individual contracts. There are, broadly, 2 routes to this conclusion, 1 highly 
threatening from an employee's point of view, and the other less so. 
The less threatening route begins from a workforce that is highly diverse, whether 
because of the technology in use or the range of the organization's products or services, or 
because of the demographic characteristics of the workers. It may also be coupled with an 
assessment of the competitive position of the organization in the market and a desire to 
respond in more innovative ways to those competitive pressures. The employer may 
-1'l>elieve that the needs both of the organization and the employees may be furthered by a 
J greater diversity of employment conditions, to the degree that this is l!<fst achieved 
~ through individual contracts. Employees with skills in shan supply may share this 
assessment. This opttoit'is likely only to apply in small workplaces undertaking a range 
of productive activities or with a demographically diverse workforce. In other cases, a 
series of collective contracts would meet this situation better and entail lower transaction 
costs. 
The version of this approach that workers find threatening is the straightforward 
desire to cut back on labour costs and lower employment conditions. This flows from 
the correct assessment that large categories of workers, especially the unskilled, already 
weakened by present labour market circumstances, are doubly disadvantaged when 
negotiating on an individual basis. Already we are seeing examples of this strategy in a 
range of contexts. Many cases have been reported of employers inducing or coercing 
workers to sign individual contracts which substantially worsen their employment 
i 
Bargaining options 169 
conditiotis. The appeal of this option may have been somewhat reduced by the Labour 
Court's ruling in the Superstrike Bowling Centre case,l that neither party may 
unilaterally vary existing conditions of employment, and its grant of a compliance order 
to enforce this decision. Unless the decision is overturned on appeal, this constitutes a 
significant limitation on the ability of employers to achiev·e significant change in 
employment conditions through the imposition of individual contracts.) In practice, of 
course, the key question is whether workers are able to enforce the right'not to have their 
employment conditions unilaterally varied. They will often be unable to do so. 
Alternatively, workers faced with dismissal if they do not agree to changes in their 
employment conditions, will often consent rather than take what will seem to them to be 
the hazardous option of a personal grievance action with the possibility of some 
monetary gain many months down the track. This is particularly the case if they face an 
extended stand-down period for the unemployment benefit 
Fourth, in the state sector, employers may take the initiative to greatly extend the 
scope of individual bargaining, and further reduce the level of collective coverage. The 
growth of managerialism in the state sector, and the associated reduction of collective 
bargaining ~coverage since 1988, indicates a general management preference for less union 
influence over the determination of ~employment conditions. Howev~er, it ·cannot be 
immediately deduced from this that state sector management has a strong wish to take 
that trend even further. There may be good reasons, from management's perspective, for 
the retention of collective bargaining, at .more or less the levels in place now. Public 
service employers have indicated some desire to extend the scope of individual coverage, 
but not to any radical degree. The transaction ~costs of doing so are an inhibition. 
However, as, noted abov·e, pressure for individual contracts in the state sector may come 
as much from employees as from management Any significant shift to individual 
contracts in the state sector would carry implications for the J:Ole of the State Services 
Commission (SSC), which is designated as the employer party for the negotiation of 
collectiv~e contracts, but has no statutory authority over individual contracts. 
Fifth, a slightly different situation applies for those non-unionized employees in the 
private sector not covered by collective negotiations in the past, but rather by individual 
contracts of varying comprehensiveness. In the new environment, these employees may 
seek more elaborate contracts, particularly if they see individual contracts being negotiated 
for some ~employees previously covered by a collective document 
{ A final ~consideration is whether an organization is ~equipped to deal with the greater 
complexity required of human resource management by a shift to individual contracts. 
For all their faults, collective arrange.ments have the undoubted virtue of relative 
simplicity. Individual contracts may not be worth the trouble they unavoidably create. 
3. Collective c~ontracts 
The number of collectiv~e contracts 
One of the frrst issues to be considered is the number of collective contracts. In 
submissions to the Select Committee considering the Employment Contracts Bill, a 
number of large employers expressed grave ~concern at the possibility that their present 
satisfactory bargaining arrangements - which for those organizations meant mainly 
enterprise bargaining - might be disrupted by groups of employees using separate 
bargaining agents and seeking difterent collective contracts. There is nothing in the Act 
which specifically prevents this. Two issues arise. What is the likelihood of workers 
acting in this way and, if so., what are their prospects of success? 
1 Grant v Superstrike Bowling Centres Ltd (1991) Unreported ALC 81~1. 
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Clearly, employees who are presently under one document are only likely to seek a 
range of collective contracts where they believe they are ill-served by their present 
bargaining arrangements. In those circumstances, their position may be an accurate 
assessment of the past perfottnance of either their union, their employer or both. It may 
also reflect unrealistic expectations about what can be achieved. These expectations may 
be fed by rival bargaining agents touting for business. A sequence of bid and counter-bid 
will make it more difficult for any bargaining agent, including unions, to take the most 
rational overall view of the bargaining process, and they may feel constrained to push for 
a better return, particularly for disaffected groups. Dissatisfaction with a single contract 
may be a product of diversity, where dissimilar groups are bound into the same document 
and believe.their particular needs can best be furthered by a series of collective contracts. 
Employers may make the same judgement. But nornaally, it would be expected that 
employers will have a general preference for a single collective contract 
The prospects of these groups achieving their target depends upon their relative 
industrial strength under the new regime. Their inability to strike while they remain 
under a collective contract is a severe impediment 
Bargaining agents 
State employers are in at least one unique position under the Employment Contracts 
Act. They do not have to decide who their bargaining agent will be. The Act, or to be 
precise the State Sector Act, docs that for them by designating the SSC as the employer 
party. All other employers and employees have to make that decision. There is no 
shortage of potential bargaining agents from whom to choose. Indeed, among the legal 
profession, for whom business has been slow in recent times, there is a veritable "feeding 
frenzy"2 as lawyers discover a potential area of new business. In addition, a range of new 
bargaining agents have established themselves, targeted chiefly at employers, but willing 
to represent employees as well. 
Employers and employees may choose to do their own bargaining, although they 
should be mindful of the dictum that lawyers representing themselves have fools for 
clients. However, in some cases this may be a rational choice. On the employee side, 
some particular individuals or even small groups may have the requisite skills to 
negotiate on their own behalf. Many firms will also prefer to represent themselves, 
either because of size or because of management's industrial relations expertise. For 
employers the choice of bargaining agent may be difficult. Some may be able to 
continue to rely upon an employers organization, but for many this will not be possible. 
Legal firms and other private bargaining agents are mostly untried in the field, and there 
will probably be a difficult period as reputations are gained and lost and employers assess 
who can be relied upon. Many finns will choose to develop their own industrial relations 
or human resource management expertise to cope with the new regime. 
For workers who do not wish to represent themselves, the choice is whether to join 
or remain a member of the union that has traditionally had coverage over their work, 
switch to another union or engage a bargaining agent. Most workers are likely to find 
union representation the most cost effective option, particularly when considering the 
long-term administration of the contract. This is most obviously the case so far as 
personal grievances are concerned, where most individuals will find the costs of hiring a 
lawyer or other agent to represent them to be prohibitive. Unions· have, however, 
traditionally offered their members unifoun solutions to general problems. Where groups 
of members believe they have particular concerns which are not being met by their union, 
then a different union or a bargaining agent becomes more attractive. All unions have 
2 I gratefully acknowledge John Robson, a lawyer himself and one who understands the 
legal profession and their little ways, for this vivid metaphor. 
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multi-employer contracts will depend on employer IDflld..,...e 
hazardous strategy of deploying industrial muscle. It is quite 
employers will prefer to retain multi-employer documents. 
Hursthouse (1990) indicates some measure of satisfaction a•••-s 
the award system. Employers are likely to opt for 11 1 I IIIW 
actively want wages and employment conditions to be taken eat ef 
traditionally one of the major justifiCations for the awmd system in New 
was historically often coupled with protectionist economic policies 
domestic producers against external competition, whilst the award system ... ••• d 
domestic competition over the recruitment and retention of labour and ita G81t. 
Deregulation has eliminated much of this rationale for multi-employer lftlt 881: 
all, and there will still be some cases where it remains a rational approach. 11ds is 
particularly so where standardized production systems reduce the pressure for flexible and 
innovative use of labour. Multi-employer negotiations may also be favoured iD patlicular 
sectors, such as the dairy industry, where a small number of major employen caa be 
coordinated through a strong central body. In addition, many smaller employers prefer to 
join multi-employer negotiations either because they lack the resources or the expalise to 
do it themselves, or because they do not want to negotiate directly with their own 
employers. Equally, however, small employers may prefer to negotiate directly with 
their employees, either because they have a good relationship with them - or wish to 
develop one - or because they see this as a way of cutting labour costs. As noted above, 
there is already some indication that the latter strategy is being adopted in a nurnbez of 
cases. 
Multi-employer bargaining in tbe state sector 
Circumstances are quite different in the state sector, where the stabltory role of the 
sse as employer party leaves it well placed, should it so choose, to ensure the 
continuation of the multi-employer bargaining which has developed in health and 
education. The SSC negotiates multi-employer documents on behalf of (and in 
consultation with) the area health boards and the various education employers. The fubJre 
industrial relations regime for the health sector is of course quite unce11ain following the 
Government's decision to replace area health boards with regional health authorities wbich 
will be essentially purchasers of services from public and private providers. 
For the SSC, a major problem in contemplating a move away from natioDBI 
bargaining is the fiscal constraint and the desire of the Government to retain 
control over wage outcomes through the sse. On the face of it, a stem cash 
policy, in which central government absolutely refuses to allocate any extra resources to 
compensate for unwise wage settlements, should do the trick. But in practice. 
might not be so straightforward, and a strategy which prevented the question of 
for extra resources from ever arising has greater fiscal appeal to the Govctlnmeat 8lld tile 
SSC. Even the present system offers no absolute guarantee of fiscal CODtrol, as 
by the overrun in teachers' pay in 1990-91 and the necessity for supplementary eslimaiiS 
to be voted to make up the shortfall. 
Regardless of the size of any sub-national settlements, there is also COIICfiD mer the 
potential relativity impact of uncoordinated settlements. Transaction COI18 for the SC 
would also be higher. Nonetheless, there remains a potential conttadicdea between tile 
Government's stated industrial relations policy which is to 
bargaining, and a continuation of national multi-employer bargainina in aad 
education. However, the Government's policy is also that employers- and -
should be able to choose the type of bargaining they prefez, and so the q881tioa 
to whether either party in health or education might choose to move away from 
bargaining. 
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There is as yet no indication that unions in either the health or education sectors have 
any desire to shift away from national bargaining. For their part, employers are more 
likely to opt for sub-national bargaining where they believe they operate principally in a 
regional labour .market, where funding and budgetary development is regionally based and 
where the transaction costs of doing so are acceptable. 
In the health sector, regional bargaining had understandable appeal to some area 
health boards as a response to the increasing diversity and difficulty of their budgetary 
positions, and this appeal may have grown in the near future. However, their enthusiasm 
was tempered by their reliance upon a national labour market for medical and nursing staff 
and senior management. On the other hand, separate contracts could also be seen as a 
way of overcoming .medical staff shortages. 'Transaction costs would have been lower 
than under the present arrangements. The boards had, in fact, prior to their abolition, 
proposed separate regional documents for junior doctors. This proposal continues under 
the new regim~e of commissioners and is being resisted by the doctors' union. The new 
regional health authorities will presumably not be large employers and will deal 
regionally with their mostly administrative staff. The proposed relationship between 
public health providers, particularly the Crown health agencies, who will be large 
employers, and the sse in the new :regime is unknown at this stage. 
In the education sector, the existence of a national labour market for all teaching staff 
encourages retention of multi-employer documents. Boards or councils which face 
difficulties in attracting staff in particular subJects or disciplines, or to particular 
geographical areas, may be willing to pay a premium to overcome this problem, 
although ranges of rates could also solve it. Bulk funding of the compulsory sector 
would not necessarily lead to lower level detennination of pay and conditions. It has not 
done so in the tertiary sector. However, to the extent that the Government wishes to put 
in place a regime which actively encourages competition among educational institutions, 
then a mov~e to enterprise bargaining is more likely. The transaction costs of enterprise 
bargaining ·would be prohibitively high in the pre-school and primary sectors, less so in V 
secondary but possibly lower than at present in tertiary. 
Enterprise bargaining 
One of the most striking develop.men ts in bargaining since 1987 is the contrasting 
fate of enterprise bargaining in the private and public sectors. Ifarbridge (1991) has 
shown that there has been a pr~ecipitate fall in the number of workers cover~ed by single 
employer agreements in the private sector. The chief reason for this, of course, was the 
single set of negotiations principle in the Labour Relations Act, by which second tier 
bargaining was eliminated, forcing unions to choose between awards and single employer 
documents. The public service, by contrast, moved from centralized service-wide 
occupational bargaining to enterprise bargaining. 
Employers and employees covered by enterprise documents are well placed to 
continue those arrangements under the Employment Contracts Act But in aJJ ,cases, this 
depends upon the willing cooperation of all individuals involved. Their cooperation 
cannot be coerced as in the past. The preservation of an enterprise agreement may be 
jeopardized by the defec·tion of one or more individuals or groups, whether on an 
occupational basis or not, whether through their union or another union, by using a 
separate bargaining agent or by representing themselv~es. Obviously, their capacity to 
defect successfully and secure a separate contract will depend on r~elative bargaining 
strength. This will tend to be in the employer's favour at the moment, but will not 
always be so, .and even in the present labour market circumstances there are particular 
groups in an organization whose attempt to defect from the ~enterprise contract would be 
either successful or highly disruptive (or both). Employers and unions in the private 
' 
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sector who have recendy completed • 
unlikely to want to see that hastily thmWII 
The status quo option may be In 
Crown agencies), where at present die 
negotiate national departmental docullleats. 
supplemented by a small number of 
managemenL These structoral circumstances 8f-
are conducive to the prese1 vation of those 
the sse to keep centtal control over 
will prefer to keep the number of documents It ts 
Government or the SSC might consider regional ba"Jaialag ftJr die 1J1ib11c 
Regional labour markets operate at the entry grades fer IIIIMaiag, 
related staff, but funding remains nationally based. For middle level posldolla 
and for all specialist positions, there is a tendency for a Dadonallabour te apfly. 
The PSA has indicated a general preference for the retention of national 
documents. The main threat to their preservation will come from particalar 
groups, some of whom will no doubt switch to other apnts. Pllblie 
employers will have to consider their response to that development. 
5. Conclusion 
Wholesale radical change to bargaining arrangements is unlikely in the ilnmaliate 
future. Nonetheless, no observer can fail to be sttuck by the pace and scope of change in 
the short period since the Employment Contracts Act came into effecL Many employers 
have taken swift advantage of the new possibilities now open to them. More wuryingly, 
the Act has contributed to a sense among some employers that they now rqle tbo 
workplace, unrestrained by unions or collective bargaining requirements. 1bis P"'LOI' has 
outlined some of the complex issues to be considered in any assessment of bargaining 
options under the Act. Based on past experience we can be sure that there me many 
issues and possible outcomes that neither this nor other commentaries have yet 
In other words, we should expect the unexpected. 
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